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I FIND YOUR LACK OF A CONTRACT DISTURBING:
PENNSYLVANIA LIMITS THE FORCE OF RIGHT TO KNOW
LAW OVER MEDICAID SUBCONTRACTORS IN
DENTAL BENEFIT PROVIDERS, INC. v. EISEMAN
PAMELA PUTNAM*
“Secrecy is the linchpin of abuse of power . . . its enabling force.
Transparency is the only real antidote.”1
I. INTRODUCTION: PRIVATIZATION CREATES
IN THE FORCE

A

GREAT DISTURBANCE

In recent decades, state and local governments have increasingly
turned to private contractors to carry out an ever-widening variety of government functions.2 Depending on the community, many services traditionally provided by government—everything from public welfare
programs to schools and prisons—are now delivered or operated by private entities on the government’s behalf.3 Many scholars predict this
trend will continue as cash-strapped legislatures, motivated by faith in mar* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law.
This Note is dedicated to my friends and family who have supported me
throughout my life and law school career. I would like to thank all those at the
Villanova Law Review who provided valuable guidance and feedback while I was
writing this Note, especially Elizabeth Flanagan, Rebecca Feuerhammer, Shane
O’Halloran, Jillian Hart, Lauren Anthony, and Bob Turchick. I would also like to
thank Laval Miller-Wilson of the Pennsylvania Health Law Project, who first
introduced me to the Eiseman cases. The headings used throughout this Note were
inspired by themes and dialogue from the Star Wars movie franchise.
1. GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND
THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE 12 (2014).
2. See Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government Through § 1983, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (2009) (noting growing trend of privatization among state
and local governments); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2003) (“Privatization is now virtually a national obsession.”).
3. See Frankel, supra note 2, at 1451–52 & nn.13–20 (listing examples of “core
government services” that have been privatized at state and local levels, including
“operating prisons, providing medical care to prisoners, administering welfare and
public benefits programs, processing parking tickets, providing private security services, collecting government debts, fighting fires, and overseeing foster care and
child placement programs” (footnotes omitted)); Metzger, supra note 2, at
1377–94 (discussing several examples of privatization, including “Medicare and
Medicaid managed care,” “private prisons,” “reliance on privatization” to run welfare programs such as TANF, Head Start, homeless shelters, and food banks, and
increasing private control over public education due to charter schools, “education management organizations [ ], and voucher programs”).

(395)
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ket-based solutions, look for new ways to reduce costs and improve
efficiency.4
Pennsylvania is no exception to this privatization trend.5 Beginning in 1997, Pennsylvania privatized its Medicaid delivery system,
switching most Medicaid recipients from a traditional fee-for-service model to a managed care model, where the state contracts with
private health insurance companies to administer Medicaid services
through their provider networks.6 As of July 2015, approximately 70%
4. See Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public’s Right to Know: The Debate over Privatization and Access to Government Information Under State Law, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
825, 829 (2000) (“As governments continue to have difficult financial times, contracting out has become a widely considered option.” (footnote omitted)); Metzger, supra note 2, at 1379 (“Privatization seems likely only to expand further in the
near future, fueled by increasing belief in market-based solutions to public
problems.” (citing Martha Minnow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the
New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1240 (2003))).
5. See, e.g., Kate Giammarise, State Prisons Could Outsource More Mental Health
Services, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (May 24, 2013, 7:51 PM), http://www.post-gazette
.com/news/state/2013/05/24/State-prisons-could-outsource-more-mental-healthservices/stories/201305240175 [https://perma.cc/2YCK-SQRD] (discussing legislative proposal to outsource up to 187 mental health jobs from Pennsylvania Department of Corrections to private contractors); Julia Terruso, State Says DHS
Should Trim Staff, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 23, 2016, 1:08 AM), http://www.philly
.com/philly/news/20160823_State_says_DHS_should_trim_staff.html [https://
perma.cc/BL6F-5Q56] (discussing transfer of child and family service case management responsibilities from Philadelphia Department of Human Services to private community-based contractors).
6. See PA. DEP’T OF PUB. WELFARE, MED. ASSISTANCE BULLETIN NO. 99-96-08,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HEALTHCHOICES PROGRAM 1 (1996) (announcing implementation of HealthChoices, Pennsylvania’s mandatory managed care program).
Pennsylvania implemented mandatory managed care in phases by region, beginning with the greater Philadelphia area in 1997 and ending with the northeast
Pennsylvania region in 2013. See id. (announcing implementation of
HealthChoices in five counties surrounding Philadelphia); see also PA. DEP’T OF
PUB. WELFARE, MED. ASSISTANCE BULLETIN NO. 99-13-02, HEALTHCHOICES PHYSICAL
HEALTH MANAGED CARE NEW EAST ZONE EXPANSION 1 (2013) (announcing implementation of HealthChoices in twenty-two counties in northeastern Pennsylvania
effective March 2013); PA. DEP’T OF PUB. WELFARE, MED. ASSISTANCE BULLETIN NO.
99-12-08, HEALTHCHOICES PHYSICAL HEALTH MANAGED CARE NEW WEST ZONE EXPANSION 1 (2012) (announcing implementation of HealthChoices in thirteen
counties in northwestern Pennsylvania effective October 1, 2012); PA. DEP’T OF
PUB. WELFARE, MED. ASSISTANCE BULLETIN NO. 99-97-08, HEALTHCHOICES SOUTHWEST MANDATORY MANAGED CARE PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE 1 (1997)
(announcing expansion of HealthChoices to Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver, Butler, Fayette, Greene, Indiana, Lawrence, Washington, and Westmoreland counties
beginning January 1999).
Under a fee-for-service model, the government pays healthcare providers directly for each service provided. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 1380 (explaining
differences between fee-for-service and managed care models). Under managed
care, the government pays a managed care organization (MCO), usually a private
insurance company, a flat rate for each Medicaid beneficiary they enroll. See id. at
1380–81. Because the MCO receives the same capitated rate regardless of the services provided, this approach incentivizes MCOs to prioritize preventative services
and cut down on unnecessary procedures or services. See id. at 1380–82.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss2/4

2

Putnam: I Find Your Lack of a Contract Disturbing: Pennsylvania Limits th

2017]

NOTE

397

of Pennsylvania Medicaid recipients were enrolled in a managed care
plan.7
Some observers are concerned that increasing privatization will lead
to less transparency with regard to the activities of publicly funded programs.8 These commentators warn that although all fifty states have freedom of information laws providing for public access to certain
government records, most of these statutes “do not explicitly grant access
to documents that are in the hands of private entities.”9 As a result, information that was once available to the media and the general public could
become unavailable unless states update their freedom of information
statutes.10
At least one scholar has argued that where legislatures are unable or
unwilling to amend their statutes, courts must step in and enforce the
spirit of freedom of information laws through judicial interpretation.11
7. See VERNON K. SMITH ET AL., MEDICAID REFORMS TO EXPAND COVERAGE, CONCOSTS AND IMPROVE CARE: RESULTS FROM A 50-STATE MEDICAID BUDGET SURVEY
FOR STATE FISCAL YEARS 2015 AND 2016, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 29 tbl.5 (Oct. 2015).
8. See, e.g., Feiser, supra note 4, at 826 & nn.3–5 (opining that unless right-toknow statutes are updated, states could shield records from the public by transferring them to private companies); John L. Gedid, Pennsylvania’s 2008 Right to Know
Law: Open Access at Last, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 459, 474 (2011) (expressing concern that
overly general provisions of Pennsylvania’s Right to Know Law will give agencies
incentive to withhold records); accord Frankel, supra note 2, at 1452 (“As governments continue to delegate public functions to private companies, it is critically
important to determine the appropriate set of background rules against which
privatization takes place in order to ensure that private companies give proper
respect to public values . . . .”); Sarah Somers & Jane Perkins, Sunshine and Accountability: The Pursuit of Information on Quality in Medicaid Managed Care, 5 ST. LOUIS U.
J. HEALTH & POL’Y 153, 154–55 (2011) (emphasizing “urgent need” for public access to information on healthcare spending and quality in Medicaid managed care
programs).
9. See Feiser, supra note 4, at 826 (warning that failure to amend freedom of
information statutes could undermine public access to information); see also id. at
835 (noting legislatures “overwhelmingly . . . have not accounted for the privatization trend”).
10. See id. at 826, 834 (summarizing fears raised by press members and efforts
by media to push for updates to freedom-of-information statutes).
11. See, e.g., id. at 835 (observing that “as long as some legislatures remain
silent on the issue, state courts will face decisions that require balancing the arguments and staying in tune with the spirit of the access laws . . . . [T]he courts must
tackle the issue in the absence of statutory amendments”); see also Alexa Capeloto,
Transparency on Trial: A Legal Review of Public Information Access in the Face of Privatization, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 19, 22, 41 (2013) (noting “[i]n reality, the courts have
had to do the heavy lifting” of interpreting freedom of information statutes and
advocating “public good” standard for determining public access to non-public
entity records); Gedid, supra note 8, at 474 (“One can only hope that [Pennsylvania] courts will construe the RTKL in a manner that is consistent with the
legislative intent . . . .”). Feiser advocates for judicial action in the absence of
legislative action. See Feiser, supra note 4, at 835. Feiser surveys the variety of approaches taken by state courts confronted with gaps or ambiguities in their respective public access statutes. See generally id. at 835–61. Some states have taken more
flexible approaches, permitting access where an entity performs a “public function,” or where the public nature of the records or the “totality of the factors”
TROL
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declined to take such an approach
when it recently considered the reach of Pennsylvania’s Right to Know
Law (RTKL) with regard to the records of Medicaid contractors and subcontractors.12 In Department of Public Welfare v. Eiseman13 (Eiseman I), the
court held that records revealing rates paid by Medicaid contractors to
dental subcontractors, or directly to health care providers, were public
records subject to disclosure under the RTKL.14 However, in the companion case of Dental Benefit Providers, Inc. v. Eiseman15 (Eiseman II), the court
concluded the RTKL did not permit access to records showing the rates
paid by dental subcontractors to individual dental providers because there
was no direct contractual relationship between the subcontractors and a
government agency.16
Although the holding in Eiseman I would appear to be a win for transparency, the court’s reasoning, especially in Eiseman II, substantially limits
the reach of the RTKL with regard to subcontractor records.17 This Note
discusses the important limitations of the RTKL highlighted by Eiseman I
and Eiseman II and the implications of the decisions.18 Part II provides
supports public disclosure of the records. See id. at 837–53 (providing detailed
examples of “flexible approaches” taken by state courts). Other states, Feiser concludes, have adopted more restrictive standards, requiring a certain amount of
public funding, limiting the applicability of statutes to entities created by the legislature or previously determined to be subject to public information laws, or requiring some kind of possession or control of the records by a government agency. See
id. at 853–60 (discussing state courts taking restrictive approaches to applying public records laws to private entities).
12. See generally Dental Benefit Providers v. Eiseman (Eiseman II), 124 A.3d
1214, 1223 (Pa. 2015) (holding records of Medicaid subcontractors not subject to
disclosure under RTKL and suggesting legislative action needed to address availability of subcontractor records).
13. 125 A.3d 19 (Pa. 2015).
14. See id. at 29–32 (concluding requested records were “financial records”
subject to disclosure under RTKL). For further discussion of the court’s reasoning
in Eiseman I, see infra notes 106–16 and accompanying text.
15. 124 A.3d 1214 (Pa. 2015).
16. See id. at 1223 (announcing court’s holding). For full discussion of the
court’s rationale in Eiseman II, see infra notes 117–29 and accompanying text.
17. See PUB. INT. L. CTR., Case Updates: Pa. Supreme Court Rules Medicaid Payment
Records Must Be Released to Public, http://www.pilcop.org/pa-supreme-court-rulesmedicaid-payment-records-must-be-released-to-public/ [https://perma.cc/WD9GUS2N] (last visited Apr. 2, 2017) (characterizing Eiseman I decision as “an important win for transparency and accountability” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Benjamin Geffen, Staff Attorney for Public Interest Law Center)); see also
Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1223 (requiring contractual relationship for access to thirdparty records); Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Eiseman (Eiseman I), 125 A.3d 19, 33 (Pa.
2015) (declining implicitly to follow prior cases interpreting reach of RTKL
broadly). For fuller explanation of how Eiseman I and Eiseman II limit the reach of
the RTKL, see infra notes 130–53 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 130–63 and accompanying text for full analysis of the Eiseman decisions and their real-world impact.
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background on the RTKL and relevant case law.19 Part III recounts the
facts and procedural history of Eiseman I and Eiseman II.20 Part IV discusses how the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania arrived at its holding in
each case.21 Part V provides a critical examination of the court’s reasoning in both cases with a particular emphasis on its rationale in Eiseman II.22
Lastly, Part VI discusses the real-world impact of the Eiseman I and Eiseman
II decisions and supports legislative action to revise the RTKL to permit
access to subcontractor records.23
II. THE RTKL AWAKENS: HISTORY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
RIGHT TO KNOW LAW
Pennsylvania’s RTKL was initially passed in 1957.24 Since then, the
legislature has expanded the reach of the RTKL with major amendments
in 2002 and 2008.25 The 2008 RTKL, in particular, significantly broadened the categories of records considered public.26 However, Pennsylvania courts applying the 2008 RTKL have frequently done so in ways
that actually restrict, rather than expand, public access to records of government contractors and subcontractors.27
19. For background information on the statutory provisions and case law relevant to the issues discussed in Eiseman I and Eiseman II, see infra notes 28–78 and
accompanying text.
20. For a full discussion of the facts and proceedings leading up to the Eiseman I and Eiseman II decisions, see infra notes 79–101 and accompanying text.
21. For an explanation of the court’s reasoning in Eiseman I, see infra notes
106–16 and accompanying text. For discussion of the court’s reasoning in Eiseman
II, see infra notes 117–29 and accompanying text.
22. For a critical analysis of the court’s holdings in Eiseman I and Eiseman II,
see infra notes 130–53 and accompanying text.
23. For discussion of the practical impact of the Eiseman decisions, see infra
notes 154–63 and accompanying text.
24. See Gedid, supra note 8, at 461 (introducing history of RTKL). For additional historical background on the 1957 RTKL, see infra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
25. See id. at 463–68 (discussing 2002 and 2008 amendments to RTKL). For
fuller discussion of the 2002 and 2008 amendments to the RTKL and their impact,
see infra notes 31–40 and accompanying text.
26. See generally Gedid, supra note 8, at 465–68 (discussing 2008 amendments
to RTKL). For further analysis of the impact of the 2008 amendments to the
RTKL, see infra notes 33–40 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Office of the Budget v. Office of Open Records, 11 A.3d 618, 623
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (holding payroll records of government subcontractor
were not subject to disclosure under RTKL because they were not within agency’s
possession and determining agency’s right to audit records did not establish possession); Buehl v. Office of Open Records, 6 A.3d 27, 31 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010)
(holding prison contractor’s records showing purchase of items for prison commissary were not subject to disclosure under RTKL because they did not directly
relate to its contract with Pennsylvania Department of Corrections).
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A. A Long Time Ago in a Legislature Far, Far Away . . .
Pennsylvania originally passed its RTKL in 1957 in order to provide
public access to certain enumerated categories of public records.28 These
included “[a]ny account, voucher or contract dealing with the receipt or
disbursement of funds by an agency or its acquisition, use or disposal of
services or of supplies, materials equipment or other property.”29 In 2002,
the Legislature made significant amendments to the RTKL in an effort to
address weaknesses in the 1957 statute.30 While the earlier statute left
agencies significant discretion in how or whether they handled RTKL requests, 2002 amendments established a procedure for processing RTKL
requests and expanded the definition of records to include electronic
files.31 Importantly, however, the legislature retained the same definition
of public records as the 1957 statute.32
B. 2008 RTKL Brings a New Hope
In 2008, the legislature replaced the previous RTKL with an expanded version that significantly broadened the categories of records subject to public disclosure.33 Under the current RTKL, a “public record”
subject to disclosure includes any “record, including a financial record, of
a Commonwealth or local agency” that is not privileged, subject to one of
several exceptions enumerated in the statute, or otherwise exempt under
a separate state or federal law.34 Notably, the definition of “financial record” is virtually identical to the statutory definition of a public record
under the 2002 RTKL; thus, the 2008 definition of public records incorpo28. See Gedid, supra note 8, at 461 (summarizing 1957 RTKL).
29. 65 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 66.1 (West 2007) (repealed 2008)
(defining “public record”).
30. See Gedid, supra note 8, at 463–65 (summarizing weaknesses addressed by
2002 Amendments to RTKL). Gedid notes several issues with the 1957 RTKL,
most notably that it put the burden on the requester to prove that the records were
public and that the need for public access outweighed any exceptions raised by the
agency. See id. at 461 (discussing “balancing test” applied by courts under 1957
RTKL). Moreover, the statute had no penalties to deter agencies from arbitrarily
denying RTKL requests or imposing onerous limitations on how the public could
access records. See id. at 462.
31. See generally id. at 464 (describing 2002 RTKL amendments). The 2002
RTKL required agencies to cooperate with RTKL requests in “good faith,” in a
timely manner, and to provide a written explanation of any decision to deny a
request. See id. Additionally, the 2002 RTKL provided for an appeals procedure.
See id. at 464–65.
32. See 65 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 66.1 (West 2007) (repealed 2008)
(defining “public record”).
33. See Gedid, supra note 8, at 466 (describing important changes to statutory
definitions of “record” and “public record”); see also 65 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 67.101–67.3104 (West 2016) (superseding Sections 66.1–66.9 effective
February 14, 2008).
34. See 65 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67.102 (providing definition of
“public record”); see also id. § 67.708(b) (enumerating various categories of information exempt from disclosure).
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rates a large category of documents that already would have been considered public under the previous statute.35 The 2008 statute expands the
reach of the prior RTKL even further by broadly defining a “record” as
any “[i]nformation . . . that documents a transaction, business or activity of
the agency.”36
Under Section 305(a) of the 2008 RTKL, “record[s] in the possession
of a Commonwealth agency or local agency shall be presumed to be [ ]
public record[s].”37 Additionally, under Section 506(d)(1), records “in
the possession of a party with whom the agency has contracted to perform
a governmental function” are considered public records if they “directly
relate[ ] to the governmental function.”38 Section 708(b) exempts various
categories of records from disclosure under the RTKL, including “trade
secrets and confidential proprietary information.”39 However, these exceptions do not apply to financial records.40
C. Don’t Get Technical with Me! Pennsylvania Courts Take on 2008 RTKL
Pennsylvania courts applying the 2008 RTKL have acknowledged the
need to interpret the statute broadly in light of its objective of promoting
35. Compare id. § 66.1 (repealed 2008) (defining “public record”), with id.
§ 67.102 (defining “financial record”). See also Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Eiseman,
85 A.3d 1117, 1134 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (McCullough, J., dissenting) (noting
current definition of “financial record” “duplicates verbatim the definition of a
‘public record’ ” under prior statute).
36. See 65 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67.102 (defining “record”); see
also Gedid, supra note 8, at 466–67 (observing that under this broad definition,
“virtually any information item . . . constitutes a record, as long as it is connected to
the duties of the agency”).
37. See 65 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67.305(a) (establishing presumption of openness for records in possession of agency).
38. Id. § 67.506(d)(1). The exact language of Section 506(d)(1) is as follows:
A public record that is not in the possession of an agency but is in the
possession of a party with whom the agency has contracted to perform a
governmental function on behalf of the agency, and which directly relates to the governmental function and is not exempt under this act, shall
be considered a public record of the agency for purposes of this act.
Id.
39. See id. § 67.708(b)(11) (exempting from disclosure “[a] record that constitutes or reveals a trade secret or confidential proprietary information”). Other
categories of records exempt under Section 708(b) include: records that could
create a security risk to public events, public buildings, infrastructure, or computer
systems; records revealing various types of personal medical, financial, identification, or contact information for either public employees or beneficiaries of public
services; certain types of employment records of public employees; several types of
internal drafts or other unpublished work product reflecting pre-decision deliberations of agencies; academic transcripts; certain records related to criminal and
noncriminal investigations; DNA records; autopsy reports; library records; draft
minutes of agencies; communications between agencies and their insurance carriers; and certain communications between general assembly members and constituents. See generally id. § 708(b).
40. See id. § 708(c) (“The exceptions set forth in subsection (b) shall not apply to financial records . . . .”).
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greater transparency.41 However, when faced with third-party records,
courts have frequently chosen to read the 2008 RTKL in a way that actually
restricts access to records of private contractors and subcontractors.42
This restrictive reading is a shift from the more policy-oriented approach
taken by courts under the 1957 and 2002 statutes.43 The only prior deci41. See, e.g., Levy v. Senate of Pa., 65 A.3d 361, 381 (Pa. 2013) (“The Commonwealth Court has aptly recognized that courts should liberally construe the
RTKL to effectuate its purpose of promoting ‘access to official government information in order to prohibit secrets, scrutinize actions of public officials, and make
public officials accountable for their actions.’ ” (quoting Allegheny Cty. Dep’t of
Admin. Servs. v. A Second Chance, Inc., 13 A.3d 1025, 1034 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2011))); A Second Chance, Inc., 13 A.3d at 1037 (“[T]he General Assembly clearly
and unambiguously contemplated that all ‘public records,’ regardless of where
they are located, should be accessible to the public.”).
42. See, e.g., In re Venango Cty. Tourism Promotion Agency, 83 A.3d 1101,
1110 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (holding contractual relationship between agency
and third party required in order to access third-party records); W. Chester Univ.
of Pa. v. Browne, 71 A.3d 1064, 1068 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) (holding contractor’s
employee benefits plans did not constitute records under RTKL because they were
unrelated to its contract with public university); Allegheny Cty. Dep’t of Admin.
Servs. v. Parsons, 61 A.3d 336, 346 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) (holding employee
records belonging to county’s social services contractor were not subject to disclosure under Section 506(d)(1) of RTKL because they did not directly relate to its
performance of services for county); Giurintano v. Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 20 A.3d
613, 617 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (holding independent contractor agreements between government contractor and individual interpreters did not constitute public
records under RTKL where interpreters did not actually perform translation services under contract); A Second Chance, 13 A.3d at 1035 (finding employee information belonging to social services contractor did not constitute public records under
Section 305(a) or Section 102 of RTKL because contractor created, possessed, and
owned information sought); Honaman v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 13 A.3d 1014,
1023 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (holding tax records in possession of township tax
collector were not subject to disclosure under RTKL because tax collector was not
agency subject to RTKL and records were not in possession of township); In re
Silberstein, 11 A.3d 629, 633 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (holding records stored on
private computer of township commissioner reflecting township business were not
subject to disclosure under RTKL because commissioner did not constitute government agency); Office of the Budget v. Office of Open Records, 11 A.3d 618,
623 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (holding statutory presumption that records within
agency’s possession are public records does not extend to all records within
agency’s custody and control); Buehl v. Office of Open Records, 6 A.3d 27, 31 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2010) (holding prison contractor’s records showing prices paid for
items purchased for resale in prison commissary were not public records because
they did not directly relate to contract with department). But see SWB Yankees
LLC v. Wintermantel, 45 A.3d 1029, 1043–44 (Pa. 2012) (holding concessions bids
in possession of private contractor constituted public records where contractor
managed county-owned baseball stadium as agent of county-created stadium authority); Barkeyville Borough v. Stearns, 35 A.3d 91, 97 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012)
(finding private emails sent between borough council members related to borough business constituted public records).
43. See, e.g., Tribune-Review Publ’g Co. v. Westmoreland Cty. Hous. Auth., 833
A.2d 112, 120 (Pa. 2003) (holding settlement agreement negotiated and possessed
by third-party insurer on behalf of housing authority constituted public record
under 1957 RTKL); Sapp Roofing Co., Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n,
Local Union No. 12, 713 A.2d 627, 630 (Pa. 1998) (holding private contractor’s
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sion addressing the applicability of Pennsylvania’s RTKL to Medicaid contractors was Lukes v. Department of Public Welfare,44 which was decided
under the 2002 statute using this earlier, policy-oriented approach.45
1. Presumption of Openness Under Section 305(a)
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has interpreted Section 305(a)
of the 2008 RTKL as a signal of the legislature’s intent to “[expand] government transparency through public access to documents.”46 The effect
payroll records submitted pursuant to school district project constituted public
records because they evidenced disbursement of funds by school district); Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 747 A.2d 962, 965 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2000) (holding subcontract between construction management contractor and insurance broker was public record under 1957 RTKL); Morning Call,
Inc. v. Lower Saucon Twp., 627 A.2d 297, 300 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (holding
settlement agreement between township and private party was public record under
1957 RTKL and disbursement of settlement payments by township’s insurer did
not change public character of funds).
In Associated Builders, the Commonwealth Court considered whether the Pennsylvania Department of General Services was obligated to disclose certain insurance agreements between one of the department’s contractors and the
contractor’s insurer. See Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., 747 A.2d at 966. The
department argued it was not party to the agreements between the contractor and
its insurer, and therefore, the agreements were not public records. See id. The
court disagreed, observing that “an agency may not shield a public document from
disclosure by contracting with a third party that subsequently disperses the government funds. By paying through a third party, an agency does not change the character of those funds from public to private.” See id. at 965 (citing Morning Call, Inc.,
627 A.2d at 300–01).
In Tribune-Review Publishing Co., the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania permitted
access to a civil rights settlement agreement prepared by the housing authority’s
insurer, even though the agreement was not in the authority’s possession. See Tribune-Review Publ’g Co., 833 A.2d at 120–21. The court reasoned that if records in the
possession of an agency’s insurer did not constitute public records, then agencies
could shield records from the RTKL simply by having them prepared by an insurer
or insurer’s attorney. See id. at 118. Moreover, the court found that the insurer
acted as the agent of the housing authority. See id. at 120.
44. 976 A.2d 609 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).
45. See id. at 623, 625–26 (concluding provider agreements between Medicaid
contractor and healthcare providers constituted public records because they were
“the product of [an] agency relationship between DPW and the [Medicaid contractor]” and “reflect[ed] the disbursement of public funds in a public program”).
For additional analysis of the Lukes decision, see infra notes 72–78 and accompanying text.
46. See Levy, 65 A.3d at 381 (inferring legislative intent from “significant [policy] changes” made in 2008 statute); accord Gedid, supra note 8, at 468 (“[I]t
should be difficult to miss or mistake the legislative intent to drastically enlarge the
definition and scope of the term ‘public record.’ ”).
In Levy, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered a RTKL request by a
journalist seeking contracts and billing records from the Pennsylvania State Senate
relating to the hiring of outside counsel to represent a state senator under investigation. See Levy, 65 A.3d at 364 (providing background on case). The Senate initially responded to the request with redacted records, citing attorney-client
privilege. See id. However, the senate later asserted other exceptions under Section 708(b), including attorney work product, grand jury secrecy, and ongoing

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 4

404

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: p. 395

of Section 305(a) is to make records in the possession of an agency presumptively public unless some exception applies.47 Thus, while under the
prior statute the requester had to prove the records sought were subject to
public disclosure, Section 708(a) shifts the burden onto the agency to
show why the records should not be disclosed.48 In light of this deliberate
shift by the legislature, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated that
“courts should liberally construe the RTKL to effectuate its purpose of
promoting ‘access to official government information in order to prohibit
secrets, scrutinize actions of public officials, and make public officials accountable for their actions.’ ”49
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth Court)
has held that the presumption of openness under Section 305(a) applies
only to records in the possession of a state or local government agency, not
merely its custody or control.50 A statutory or contractual right to access
criminal investigation. See id. at 374. In prior cases, the Commonwealth Court had
held an agency waived any exceptions to the RTKL that were not raised in its initial
response to an RTKL request. See id. (discussing Signature Info. Sols., LLC. v. Aston Twp., 995 A.2d 510 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010)). In considering the validity of this
waiver rule, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded the statute was ambiguous; therefore, the court looked to the purpose of the statute to attempt to infer
the legislature’s intent. See id. at 380–81 (identifying issue and acknowledging
need to “consider other indicators of legislative intent”). While acknowledging a
clear legislative intent to promote greater transparency, the court also recognized
a specific intent to shield certain privileged documents from disclosure. See id. at
381–82. Accordingly, the court held the redacted information was not subject to
disclosure, and the senate did not waive its right to raise additional reasons for
nondisclosure by not including them in its initial response to the RTKL request.
See id. at 383 (summarizing court’s holding).
47. See id. at 381 (“[T]he RTKL presumes documents in the possession of an
agency are public records subject to disclosure, unless protected by a specific exception.” (citing 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67.305 (2015))).
48. See id. (noting how Section 708 explicitly shifts burden of proving exception onto agency); Gedid, supra note 8, at 467–68 (discussing how Section 708(a)
shifts burden from requester to agency, in contrast to earlier practices).
49. See Levy, 65 A.3d at 381 (quoting Allegheny Cty. Dep’t of Admin. Servs. v.
A Second Chance, Inc., 13 A.3d 1025, 1034 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011)).
50. See Office of the Budget v. Office of Open Records, 11 A.3d 618, 623 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2011) (holding subcontractor’s payroll records not subject to disclosure under Section 305(a)). In Office of the Budget, the requesters sought certain
payroll records for a subcontractor working on a public works project. See id. at
619. The court rejected an argument by the requesters that Section 305(a) should
be read together with Section 901 of the RTKL, which requires an agency to determine whether the agency has “possession, custody or control” of a record when it
receives an RTKL request, to conclude that all records within an agency’s custody
or control are presumed to be public records. See id. at 622. The court observed
that the plain language of Section 305(a) mentions only possession, not custody or
control. See id. at 621–22 (“Had the Legislature wanted to create the presumption
that records in an agency’s custody and control, but not in its possession, were
public records, it would have included those terms in Section 305, as it did in
Section 901, but it did not.”). The court further noted that Section 901 describes
only the procedure to be followed following an RTKL request, and “it does not
define what records are subject to disclosure under the RTKL.” See id. at 622.
Fearing that such a broad reading of Sections 901 and 305 would render Section
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third-party records is not sufficient to establish agency possession over
those records.51 However, an agency may be deemed to have “constructive possession” over records where there is evidence suggesting the
agency once had possession or is shifting records to a third party in an
effort to evade disclosure.52
2. Access to Third-Party Records Under Section 506(d)(1)
Since the Pennsylvania legislature amended the RTKL in 2008, much
of the case law related to Section 506(d)(1) has revolved around the definitions of “governmental function” and what activities “directly relate” to
the government function.53 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has in506(d)(1) mere surplusage, the court refused to read Section 305(a) as applying
to all records within the possession, custody, or control of an agency and held that
the payroll records were not subject to disclosure under Section 305(a). See id. at
622–23. Because neither party was asserting that there was a contractual relationship, the court did not consider whether the payroll records might be accessible as
third-party records under Section 506(d)(1). See id. at 621.
51. See, e.g., Honaman v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 13 A.3d 1014, 1019–22 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2011) (finding monthly reports sent by tax collector to township
showing summarizing overall tax collection did not grant township possession over
tax records); Office of the Budget, 11 A.3d at 623 (holding that explicit language of
RTKL did not make payroll records in possession of private contractor public
records merely because Pennsylvania Office of Budget had authority to audit
them).
52. See Barkeyville Borough v. Stearns, 35 A.3d 91, 97–98 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2012) (holding emails between borough council members stored on council members’ private computers were within constructive possession of borough); Office of
the Budget, 11 A.3d at 623 (noting no evidence agency was “attempting to play some
sort of shell game by shifting [ ] records to a non-governmental body”).
In Barkeyville Borough, the Commonwealth Court recognized that “constructive
possession qualifies as possession under the RTKL to presume that a record is a
public record based on Section 305.” See Barkeyville Borough, 35 A.3d at 96. Where a
record is not entitled to the presumption of openness under Section 305(a), it may
still be considered a “public record” under Section 102 if it is a record “of a Commonwealth or local agency.” See 65 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67.102 (West
2016) (stating statutory definition of “public record”); Barkeyville Borough, 35 A.3d
at 96 (stating that agency may rebut presumption under Section 305(a) by showing
records do not meet Section 102 definition of “public record”); A Second Chance,
Inc., 13 A.3d at 1035 (looking to definition of “public record” at Section 102 after
concluding records were not subject to presumption under Section 305(a)). In
assessing whether information is a record “of” an agency, the court may consider
whether the information “originated with” the agency, whether the agency “has
any ownership or possessory interest in the information,” or whether the agency
“played any role in creating the information.” See A Second Chance, Inc., 13 A.3d at
1035–36 (holding employee records of social services contractor did not constitute
public records under Section 102 because it was “information that only [the contractor] created, possesses, and owns”).
53. See, e.g., SWB Yankees LLC v. Wintermantel, 45 A.3d 1029, 1044 (Pa.
2012) (holding management of baseball stadium by private company constituted
“governmental function” where management company acted as agent of countycreated Stadium Authority); Allegheny Cty. Dep’t of Admin. Servs. v. Parsons, 61
A.3d 336, 347 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) (finding social service contractor’s records
showing names, dates of birth, and hire dates of employees did not “directly re-
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terpreted “governmental function” to include “delegation of some substantial facet of the agency’s role and responsibilities, as opposed to entry
into routine service agreements with independent contractors.”54 The
court has endorsed a “reasonably broad construction” of what constitutes a
governmental function.55 However, the court has also reasoned that the
legislature’s requirement that the activities be “governmental” was intended to limit the scope of Section 506(d)(1) in order to minimize any
unnecessary burdens on private parties.56 In interpreting the direct relationship requirement, the Commonwealth Court has held that the records
must “directly relate to the contractor’s performance of [the government]
function.”57 Records not relating to the performance of the contract are
late[ ]” to performance of government contract); Giurintano v. Dep’t of Gen.
Servs., 20 A.3d 613, 615 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (concluding independent contractor agreements between contractor and individual interpreters “directly relate” to
governmental function only if interpreter has “actually performed” translation services); Buehl v. Office of Open Records, 6 A.3d 27, 30–31 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010)
(holding prison contractor’s records showing prices paid by contractor for goods
purchased for resale in prison commissary did not “directly relate” to contract with
Department of Corrections); E. Stroudsburg Univ. Found. v. Office of Open
Records, 995 A.2d 496, 505 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (finding private foundation’s
fundraising activities on behalf of public university constituted “governmental
function”).
54. SWB Yankees LLC, 45 A.3d at 1043 (interpreting meaning of “governmental function”). In SWB Yankees, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania authorized the
disclosure of concessions bids in the possession of a private management company
(SWB Yankees LLC) that managed a minor league baseball stadium as the contractual agent of the Multi-Purpose Stadium Authority of Lackawanna County. See id.
at 1030–31 (discussing details of contractual relationship between stadium authority and contractor); id. at 1044 (holding concessionaire bids are public records
under Section 506(d)(1)). The court rejected traditional distinctions between
government and private roles, reasoning such a distinction would undermine the
goals of the RTKL, particularly in light of projects, such as the stadium authority,
that cause “line-blurring between public and private enterprise.” See id. at
1041–42. Instead, it concluded the proper standard was “the delegation of some
non-ancillary undertaking of government.” See id. at 1042.
55. See id. (concluding that “a reasonably broad construction of ‘governmental function’ best comports with the objective of the [RTKL], which is
to . . . afford[ ] [citizens] access to information concerning the activities of their
government”).
56. See id. (opining legislature used “governmental” to narrow access to thirdparty records “presumably on account of the burden, expense, and other impositions attending wholesale disclosure”); E. Stroudsburg Univ. Found., 995 A.2d at 504
(“The General Assembly also used the term ‘governmental function’ to limit access
to only those records in a contractor’s possession that relate to that function, not
other records that a contractor maintains during the normal scope of business.”).
57. See Parsons, 61 A.3d at 342 (citing SWB Yankees LLC, 45 A.3d at 1029) (explaining presumption of publicness under Section 305 does not apply to records in
possession of third parties); id. at 346 (“Section 506(d) does not reach all records
in possession of a private contractor that relate to the governmental function;
rather, the records reached are only those that relate to performance of that function.” (citing Giuritano, 20 A.3d at 615)). In Parsons, the Commonwealth Court
concluded employee information belonging to a private contractor did not “directly relate” to its contract to provide social services for the county. See id. at
344–45. The court relied considerably on the reasoning of East Stroudsburg Univer-
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deemed outside the reach of Section 506(d)(1).58
3. Evolution of the Contractual Relationship “Requirement” Under Section
506(d)(1)
In a series of cases beginning with Honaman v. Township of Lower Merion,59 the Commonwealth Court interpreted Section 506(d)(1) as requiring a direct contractual relationship between an agency and a third party
in possession of the records.60 In Honaman, the Commonwealth Court
considered whether tax records in the possession of the Lower Merion
Township Tax Collector, which was statutorily exempt from the RTKL,
were nevertheless subject to disclosure by the township.61 Drawing a comsity Foundation, Buehl, and Giurintano. See id. at 341–47 (citing E. Stroudsburg Univ.
Found., 995 A.2d at 504; Buehl, 61 A.3d at 27; Giurintano, 20 A.3d at 613) (concluding “directly relates” test focuses on performance of contract, not who is performing it). In East Stroudsburg University Foundation, the court concluded the language
of Section 506(d) was intended to restrict the statute’s reach to only those records
that “ ‘directly’ relate to carrying out the governmental function,” not to “other
records that a contractor maintains during the normal scope of business,” or
records “that may relate to the contract but do not relate to its performance.” See
E. Stroudsburg Univ. Found., 995 A.2d at 504. Applying this reasoning, the Buehl
court determined that records showing what a prison contractor paid for items
purchased for re-sale in the prison commissary did not “directly relate” to its governmental function. See Buehl, 6 A.3d at 30–31. The price paid by the contractor,
the court reasoned, was outside the scope of its contractual obligation, which was
simply to provide commissary services for the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. See id. at 31.
58. See Giurintano, 20 A.3d at 615 (holding independent contractor agreements with interpreters who never performed translation services did not “directly
relate” to governmental function). The issue in Giurintano was whether independent contractor agreements between a government contractor and individual interpreters were subject to disclosure under Section 506(d)(1) when the
interpreters never actually performed translation services. See id. The contractor
in this case, Language Services Association (LSA), had a contract with the Pennsylvania Department of General Services to deliver telephone translation services.
See id. at 614. To meet its obligations under the contract, LSA enlisted thousands
of individual interpreters through independent contractor agreements. See id. at
614 n.2. The Commonwealth Court concluded that these agreements were not
“directly related” to the government contract “because the interpreters have not
actually performed, and may never perform, translation services under the
[c]ontract.” See id. at 615 (concluding OOR properly denied RTKL request for
agreements with non-performing interpreters).
59. 13 A.3d 1014 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011).
60. See, e.g., In re Venango Cty. Tourism Promotion Agency, 83 A.3d 1101,
1110 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (“This Court requires a contractual relationship between a third party and an agency to access third-party records.” (citing Honaman,
13 A.3d at 1022–23)).
61. See Honaman, 13 A.3d at 1015–18 (summarizing facts of case). By statute,
the tax collector was not an “agency” subject to the RTKL. See id. at 1017 (discussing local tax collection law). Therefore, the tax collector was not obligated to
disclose the records. See id. at 1017–18. Nevertheless, the requesters argued the
records were subject to disclosure as records of the township because they were in
the possession and control of the township. See id. at 1018–19.
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parison with Office of the Budget v. Office of Open Records,62 the Honaman
court reasoned that the tax records could not be considered in the possession of the township because, among other reasons, there was no contract
between the township and the tax collector.63 Accordingly, the court held
the tax records were not public records.64 Notably, the Honaman court
did not explicitly discuss Section 506(d)(1).65
In In re Venango County Tourism Promotion Agency,66 the Commonwealth Court considered whether names and salary information of employees of a tourism promotion agency serving Venango County were
public records under Section 506(d)(1).67 Without any explanation, the
court cited Honaman for the assertion that Section 506(d)(1) “requires a
contractual relationship between a third party and an agency to access
third-party records.”68 The court also distinguished the relationship be62. 11 A.3d 618 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011). For a full summary of the Office of the
Budget decision, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
63. See Honaman, 13 A.3d at 1020–22 (analogizing to Office of the Budget). The
issue in Office of the Budget was not Section 506(d)(1), but rather whether the presumption under Section 305(a) extended to all records in the custody and control
of an agency. See Office of the Budget, 11 A.3d at 621–22.
64. See Honaman, 13 A.3d at 1022–23 (summarizing court’s reasoning). In
addition to the lack of a contractual relationship, the court cited several other
reasons for concluding the tax records are not public. See id. at 1022. The court
reasoned that monthly reports submitted by the tax collector to the township,
which showed overall tax revenues, did not give the township possession of records
of individual taxpayers, which remained in the custody and control of the tax collector. See id. at 1019, 1022. Moreover, the court noted there was no indication
that the township was trying to hide or shield the tax information by appointing
the tax collector. See id. at 1022.
65. See generally id. at 1019–22 (mentioning Section 506(d) only in footnotes
or quotations). Note that, while the Honaman court quoted Section 305(a) and
the statutory definitions of “record” and “public record” in the text of its discussion, the language of Section 506(d) is reprinted only in a footnote clarifying a
passing reference to that provision. See id. at 1019–20 (introducing relevant statutory provisions); id. at 1020 n.6. Moreover, the Honaman court cited an extended
excerpt from Office of the Budget discussing why the presumption under Section
305(a) does not extend to all records within an agency’s custody or control. See id.
at 1020–21 (quoting Office of the Budget, 11 A.3d at 621–23). For a fuller analysis of
the Honaman decision’s applicability to Section 506(d)(1), see infra notes 143–47
and accompanying text.
66. 83 A.3d 1101 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014).
67. See id. at 1103–04 (providing factual background on case). Venango
County appointed the Oil Region Alliance of Business, Industry, and Tourism (Alliance), a private non-profit corporation, as its “ ‘tourism promotion agency’ ” to
“promote economic development, recreation, and tourism” for the county. See id.
at 1103–04 & n.2. The Requesters sought names and salary information on employees for the Alliance. See id. at 1103. The Alliance obtained some of its funding
from tax revenues, but most of its funding came from private sources. See id. at
1109. Additionally, twenty-one out of twenty-five of the Alliance’s board members
were from the private sector, and there was no evidence of government control.
See id. at 1108. Accordingly, the court concluded the Alliance was not an agency for
purposes of the RTKL, and proceeded to consider whether the employee information was accessible as third-party records under Section 506(d)(1). See id.
68. See id. at 1110 (citing Honaman without further analysis).
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tween the Venango County and the Tourism Alliance from the principalagent relationship at issue in SWB Yankees LLC v. Wintermantel,69 concluding “SWB Yankees requires . . . . a contractual relationship, conspicuously
absent here.”70 Finding no such contractual relationship, the court held
the employee information was not a public record.71
4. Medicaid Managed Care and the 2002 RTKL
The Commonwealth Court considered the application of the RTKL
to Medicaid contractors for the first time in Lukes v. Department of Public
Welfare.72 Under HealthChoices, Pennsylvania’s managed care program
for Medicaid, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (DPW) contracts with private insurance companies (Managed Care Organizations, or
MCOs) to provide health insurance to Medicaid recipients.73 The MCOs,
in turn, negotiate contracts (Provider Agreements) with individual health
care providers to deliver health care services.74
The issue in Lukes was whether the Provider Agreements were public
records under the 2002 RTKL.75 Although the contract between DPW
69. 45 A.3d 1029 (Pa. 2012). For a full summary of the facts and holding in
SWB Yankees LLC, see supra note 54.
70. See In re Venango Cty. Tourism Promotion Agency, 83 A.3d at 1110 (explaining
“SWB Yankees requires more than performance of a governmental function”). SWB
Yankees, like Office of the Budget, did not actually address whether a contractual relationship is required under Section 506(d)(1); there was a contract, so the need for
a contractual relationship simply was not an issue. See generally SWB Yankees LLC,
45 A.3d at 1041–44 (considering scope of “governmental function” under Section
506(d)(1), without considering need for contractual relationship).
71. See In re Venango Cty. Tourism Promotion Agency, 83 A.3d at 1110 (upholding
lower court’s decision).
72. 976 A.2d 609 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).
73. See Lukes, 976 A.2d at 613 (describing Pennsylvania’s Medicaid managed
care program).
74. See id. (describing payment mechanism for HealthChoices). MCOs receive monthly payments from DPW based on the number of Medicaid recipients
they enroll. See id. The MCOs then use these public funds to pay individual
healthcare providers who deliver services to Medicaid beneficiaries. See id. However, MCOs are not required to segregate the taxpayer dollars it receives from
DPW from other funding sources; MCOs may pay providers from a general account that combines public and private funds. See id.
75. See id. at 612 (providing factual background of case). The Requesters
sought the Provider Agreement between the University of Pittsburgh Health Plan,
a Medicaid MCO, and the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, which was paid
by the Health Plan to provide hospital services for Medicaid recipients. See id. As
an initial matter, the Lukes court interpreted “record” to include “records within
an agency’s possession, custody or control.” See id. at 615–21. The 2002 definition
of “record” included documents “maintained by an agency[,]” which the court
interpreted to include possession, custody, or control. Compare 65 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 66.1 (West 2007) (repealed 2008), with Lukes, 976 A.2d at
616–20 (analyzing dictionary definition, legislative history, and purposes of RTKL
to interpret meaning of “maintain”). Because DPW had access and the ability to
“exert control” over the Provider Agreements, the court held that the agreements
were “maintained” by DPW, and were therefore “records.” See id. at 621. This
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and the MCOs stated the MCO was not formally an agent of DPW, the
Commonwealth Court drew on earlier cases to conclude the Provider
Agreements were nevertheless “the product of [an] agency relationship.”76 Furthermore, the agreements reflected the expenditure of public funds; the transfer of taxpayer dollars from DPW to the MCOs
did not make them private funds.77 Accordingly, the court held the
portion of the court’s analysis was effectively superseded by the 2008 amendments,
which removed “maintains” from the statutory definition of “record.” See 65 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67.102 (West 2016) (effective Feb. 14, 2008). The
current statutory definition of a record is “[i]nformation, regardless of physical
form or characteristics that documents a transaction or activity of an agency and
that is created, received or retained pursuant to law or in connection with a transaction, business, or activity of the agency.” Id.
76. See Lukes, 976 A.2d at 621–24 (finding agency relationship between DPW
and MCOs). The HealthChoices Agreement signed between MCOs and DPW stipulates that the MCO and “its employees, services, agents, and representatives shall
not be considered and shall not hold themselves out as the employees, servants,
agents or representatives” of DPW. See id. at 613 (quoting HealthChoices Agreement from record).
The administrative law judge had concluded the Provider Agreements were
not public records because the MCO was neither a commonwealth agency nor an
agent of an agency. See id. at 614. The Commonwealth Court rejected this argument, agreeing with the Requesters that a formal agency relationship is not required. See id. at 622–23. The court applied the agency theory developed in
Associated Builders and Tribune-Review Publishing Co., which held an agency relationship can exists if “(1) there was a manifestation by the principal that the agent
would act for it; (2) the agent accepted such an undertaking; and (3) the principal
retained control over the endeavor.” See id. at 622 (citing Tribune-Review Publ’g
Co. v. Westmoreland Cty. Hous. Auth., 833 A.2d 112, 119–20 (Pa. 2003)). The
court found DPW manifested its intent to have the MCO carry out its Medicaid
obligations on its behalf, and the MCOs accepted that undertaking, in the
HealthChoices Agreement. See Lukes, 976 A.2d at 623. Furthermore, the terms of
the agreement gave DPW significant control by requiring Provider Agreements to
adhere to strict terms and conditions and granted DPW access to MCO’s records in
order to monitor compliance, among other things. See id. at 623–24 (enumerating
“strict controls” within HealthChoices Agreement). Therefore, the court concluded the MCO was functioning as an agent of DPW. See id. at 624.
77. See Lukes, 976 A.2d at 624–25 (overturning ruling of administrative law
judge that transfer of funds from DPW to health plan converted them to private
funds). The Commonwealth Court emphasized that the disbursement of public
funds to a private company does not make the funds private money. See id. at
624–25 (citing Morning Call, Inc. v. Lower Saucon Twp., 627 A.2d 297, 300–01
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993)) (holding disbursement of settlement payments through
township’s insurer did not change public character of funds and determining settlement agreement between township and private party was public record); see also
Sapp Roofing Co., Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local Union No. 12,
713 A.2d 627, 629 (Pa. 1998) (plurality opinion) (finding private contractor’s payroll records held by school district constituted public records because they “evidence[d] a disbursement by the school district”); Associated Builders &
Contractors, Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 747 A.2d 962, 965 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000) (“[A]n agency may not shield a public document from disclosure by contracting with a third party that subsequently disperses the government funds. By
paying through a third party, an agency does not change the character of those
funds from public to private.” (citing Morning Call, Inc., 627 A.2d at 300–01)).
Moreover, because the purpose of the funds was to pay for medical treatment, not
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Provider Agreements constituted public records and were subject to disclosure.78
III. REVENGE OF THE SUBCONTRACTORS: THE COMMONWEALTH COURT
BLOCKS ACCESS TO CONTRACTOR, SUBCONTRACTOR RECORDS
IN EISEMAN I AND EISEMAN II
Five years after Lukes, the Commonwealth Court again considered the
public’s right to access records of Medicaid contractors, this time under
the 2008 RTKL.79 In Eiseman I, the Commonwealth Court was asked to
decide whether the 2008 RTKL required disclosure of records in the possession of DPW showing Medicaid MCOs’ payments to subcontractors retained to administer dental benefits.80 In a companion case, Eiseman II,
the court considered the more nuanced question of whether the 2008
RTKL reached records in the possession of dental subcontractors showing
those subcontractors’ payments to individual health care providers.81
A. Eiseman’s Request: Help Me, OOR, You’re My Only Hope
James Eiseman and the Public Interest Law Center (Requesters) filed
a RTKL request with DPW in an effort to determine what portion of the
DPW funds disbursed to MCOs for dental care ultimately went to dentists.82 In order to meet their dental care obligations under the
HealthChoices Agreement, several MCOs in southeastern Pennsylvania
hired dental insurance companies (Subcontractors) to administer dental
to support the MCOs, the Lukes court concluded the funding remained public
“until [it] reaches the intended Medicaid recipient.” See Lukes, 976 A.2d at 625
(emphasizing that MCO “does not administer [Medicaid] services, but instead acts
as an intermediary by contracting with provider hospitals to provide such
services”).
78. See id. at 627 (noting that “a party that voluntarily participates in a public
program and is receiving and disbursing public funds in furtherance of that program has no legitimate basis to assert that these activities are private and should be
shielded from public scrutiny”).
79. See generally Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Eiseman (Eiseman I Commw. Ct. Op.),
85 A.3d 1117, 1120–22 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (summarizing factual background
of case), rev’d, 125 A.3d 19 (Pa. 2015).
80. See id. at 1121 (identifying records at issue). Eiseman I Commw. Ct. Op. also
addressed whether records showing Capitation Rates paid by DPW to MCOs were
subject to disclosure. See id. However, these records were not at issue when the
case later went before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See generally Eiseman I, 125
A.3d at 26 (noting Capitation Rates were disclosed following Commonwealth
Court decision).
81. See Dental Benefit Providers, Inc., v. Eiseman (Eiseman II Commw. Ct. Op.),
86 A.3d 932, 933 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (identifying records at issue), aff’d on
narrower grounds, 124 A.3d 1214 (Pa. 2015).
82. See id. at 934 (recounting factual history of case); see also PUB. INT. L. CTR.,
supra note 17 (discussing purpose of RTKL request). Eiseman and the Public Interest Law Center were concerned that low reimbursement rates were discouraging
dentists from accepting Medicaid patients, making it harder for children on Medicaid to find dentists. See id.
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benefits through the Subcontractors’ provider networks.83 Eiseman
sought records showing: (1) the rates paid by DPW to MCOs (Capitation
Rates), (2) rates paid by MCOs directly to Subcontractors or providers
(MCO Rates), and (3) rates paid by Subcontractors to individual dental
providers (Provider Rates).84 DPW denied the request, in part on the
grounds that the rates were trade secrets or confidential proprietary information exempt under Section 708(b)(11).85
Eiseman appealed to the Office of Open Records (OOR), which
granted the request for the Capitation Rates and MCO Rates, concluding
that these were financial records not protected under Section
708(b)(11).86 The OOR also granted the request for Provider Rates, finding that these were third-party records accessible under Section 506(d)(1),
even though there was no contract between DPW and the
Subcontractors.87
B. The Commonwealth Court Strikes Back, Finds MCO and Provider Rates
Are Not Public Records
DPW, the MCOs, and the Subcontractors appealed the OOR decision
to the Commonwealth Court, which decided to consider the MCO Rates
83. See Eiseman I, 125 A.3d at 21 (discussing MCOs’ use of dental subcontractors to fulfill their pediatric dental care obligations). The five MCOs whose
records were at issue included: United Healthcare, CoventryCares, Aetna Better
Health, Health Partners of Philadelphia, and Keystone Mercy Health Plan. See id.
at 21 n.2. United Healthcare used Dental Benefits Providers as its dental subcontractor, and the remaining four MCOs used a different subcontractor, DentaQuest.
See Eiseman I Commw. Ct. Op., 86 A.3d at 1121 & n.3.
84. See Eiseman II Commw. Ct. Op., 86 A.3d at 934, 937 (summarizing Eiseman’s
RTKL request with regard to Provider Rates); Eiseman I Commw. Ct. Op., 85 A.3d at
1121 (summarizing details of Eiseman’s RTKL request with regard to Capitation
Rates and MCO Rates). The court used “Capitation Rates” to refer to “rates paid
by DPW to the MCOs, per member, per month, based on annually negotiated
capitation rates.” Eiseman I Commw. Ct. Op., 85 A.3d at 1121. “MCO Rates” includes rates paid by the MCOs directly to providers, as well as rates paid to Subcontractors; however, rates paid by the Subcontractors to providers would be considered
“Provider Rates.” See id. at 1121 n.7.
85. See Eiseman I Commw. Ct. Op., 85 A.3d at 1122 (detailing grounds for initial
DPW decision). DPW denied the records request upon the advice of the MCOs.
See id. DPW also cited the Trade Secrets Act as a basis for its decision. See id.
86. See id. (summarizing OOR’s decision). The OOR did not consider the
MCOs’ argument that the rates were protected under the Trade Secrets Act, but
rather considered only the trade secrets exemption under Section 708(b)(11). See
id. In reaching its conclusion regarding the MCO Rates, OOR relied heavily on
Lukes. See id. at 1122 (citing Lukes v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 976 A.2d 609 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2009)). Specifically, the OOR looked to Lukes for the proposition
that Provider Agreements between MCOs and hospitals were “public records” because the MCOs voluntarily participated in a public program and received public
funds. See id. at 1122 (citing Lukes, 976 A.2d at 627).
87. See Eiseman II Commw. Ct. Op., 86 A.3d at 935 (summarizing OOR decision
regarding Provider Rates).
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and Provider Rates separately.88 Eiseman I addressed the Capitation and
MCO Rates, while Eiseman II considered only the availability of the Provider Rates.89
1. The Commonwealth Court Rules MCO Rates Not Subject to Disclosure in
Eiseman I
In Eiseman I, the Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc, affirmed the
OOR’s decision ordering disclosure of the Capitation Rates but reversed
the decision to disclose the MCO Rates.90 The court agreed with the OOR
that the Capitation Rates were financial records and, consequently, the
trade secrets and proprietary information protections under Section
708(b)(11) did not apply.91 Although the court acknowledged the Trade
Secrets Act might provide separate protection, the court ultimately concluded that protection did not apply in this case because the Capitation
Rates did not constitute trade secrets.92
With regard to the MCO Rates, the Commonwealth Court held these
were not financial records for purposes of the RTKL.93 The majority concluded Lukes was not controlling because that case was decided under the
2002 RTKL.94 The court went on to find the MCO Rates constituted confidential proprietary information and were thus shielded from disclosure
88. See Eiseman I Commw. Ct. Op., 85 A.3d at 1120 n.2. (explaining procedural
position of case). The five MCOs—United Healthcare, CoventryCares, Aetna Better Health, Health Partners of Philadelphia, Keystone Mercy Health Plan—and
two Subcontractors—Dental Benefit Providers (DBP) and DentaQuest—intervened in the OOR proceedings as direct interest participants. See Eiseman II
Commw Ct. Op., 86 A.3d at 935 & n.7. Following the OOR decision, the MCOs,
Subcontractors, and DPW filed various appeals before the Commonwealth Court
that were then consolidated in to two separate cases addressing the MCO Rates
and Provider Rates, respectively. See id.
89. See Eiseman I Commw. Ct. Op., 85 A.3d at 1121 & n.7 (identifying different
items of Eiseman’s request being addressed in each case).
90. See id. at 1131 (announcing court’s holding).
91. See id. at 1124–25 (concluding Capitation Rates could not be redacted
from financial records under trade secrets and proprietary information exception
to RTKL).
92. See id. at 1124–27 (concluding OOR erred in not considering Trade
Secrets Act as separate basis for protection).
93. See id. at 1127 (concluding MCO Rates were not “financial records”). The
court interpreted the statutory definition of “financial records” strictly to mean
only those funds disbursed “by an agency;” consequently, “the funds lose their
character as public funds once they leave an agency’s hands and enter the private
sector.” See id. (emphasizing statutory definition of “financial records” under Section 102 of RTKL). Because the MCO Rates reflected disbursement of funds by
contractors and not “by an agency,” the court concluded they were not “financial
records.” See id.
94. See id. at 1125, 1127 (finding OOR’s reliance on Lukes misplaced “in light
of the substantial differences between the current RTKL and the [p]rior
[RTKL]”).
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under Section 708(b)(11).95 Judge McCullough issued a strong dissent,
arguing that the MCO Rates were financial records because, like the
records in Lukes, they were the product of an agency relationship between
DPW and the MCOs.96
2. Eiseman II: The Commonwealth Court Rules Provider Rates Not Subject to
Disclosure, Either
In Eiseman II, an en banc panel of the Commonwealth Court reversed
the OOR’s decision regarding the Provider Rates.97 First, the court held
the Provider Rates were not presumed to be public records under Section
305(a) because DPW did not have “actual or constructive possession of”
the records; consequently, the records must be analyzed as third-party
records under Section 506(d)(1).98 Second, the court concluded the Provider Rates were not subject to disclosure under Section 506(d)(1) because there was “no direct contractual relationship” between DPW and the
Subcontractors, and the records did not directly relate to the contract between DPW and the MCOs.99 Finally, reiterating the argument that Lukes
95. See id. at 1127–31 (finding sufficient evidence to show MCO Rates were
confidential and that disclosure would cause “substantial harm” to MCOs’ competitive position).
96. See id. at 1135 (McCullough, J., dissenting) (observing that “agency law
dictates that the MCOs and Subcontractors stand in the shoes of DPW and receive
and disburse public funds”). While acknowledging Lukes was abrogated in part by
the change in statute, Judge McCullough nevertheless argued these changes did
not impact Lukes’s “holding that MCOs and related entities receive and disburse
agency funds.” See id. at 1135–36 (agreeing that “Lukes was obviously superseded
by a change in statutory language” to extent it discussed agency control over
records possessed by third party but finding this immaterial given DPW had possession over records showing MCO Rates). Furthermore, Judge McCullough noted,
the definition of “financial records” was identical to the definition of “public
records” interpreted in Lukes and, thus, implicated the same analysis. See id. at
1135 (“Because . . . Lukes interpreted language identical to that presently before
this Court . . . I find our reasoning in Lukes highly persuasive, if not binding . . . .”).
97. See Eiseman II Commw. Ct. Op., 86 A.3d at 942 (announcing court’s
holding).
98. See id. at 936–39 (concluding DPW had no “actual or constructive possession” of records documenting Provider Rates). In doing so, the court explicitly
rejected Eiseman’s argument that contract provisions giving DPW “the right to
review” subcontractor records created constructive possession. See id. at 938
(“[T]his Court does not infer constructive possession from the mere availability of
the records to an agency upon request.” (citing Office of the Budget v. Office of
Open Records, 11 A.3d 618 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011))). Instead, the court held the
“litmus test” for constructive possession was “whether the records document a
transaction of the agency to which the request was directed.” See id. at 938. Finding no evidence that DPW ever had possession over the records or was seeking to
conceal them and no evidence that the records documented DPW activities, the
court concluded this “litmus test” was not met. See id. at 938–39.
99. See id. at 940, 942 (“This Court requires a contractual relationship between a third party and an agency to access third-party records.” (citing Honaman
v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 13 A.3d 1014 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011))). Because the
court found “no contract between DPW and the Subcontractors, the only way to
reach the Provider Rates [was] through the MCO’s contractual relationship with

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss2/4

20

Putnam: I Find Your Lack of a Contract Disturbing: Pennsylvania Limits th

2017]

NOTE

415

was superseded by the 2008 RTKL, the court rejected the OOR’s determination that the records were public records because they reflected disbursement of public funds.100 Judge McCullough again dissented,
applying Lukes and arguing that there was a contractual relationship between DPW and the Subcontractors because the MCOs were functioning
as agents of DPW.101
IV. THAT’S NOT HOW THE RTKL WORKS! THE PENNSYLVANIA
SUPREME COURT STEPS IN
Following the Commonwealth Court’s decision, the Requesters appealed its rulings regarding the MCO Rates and Provider Rates.102 Meanwhile, DPW released the Capitation Rates, making an appeal on that issue
unnecessary.103 In Eiseman I, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed
the Commonwealth Court’s decision and held the MCO Rates were, in
fact, subject to disclosure.104 However, in Eiseman II, the supreme court
affirmed the lower court’s decision on narrower grounds, ultimately agreeing the Provider Rates were not public records under the RTKL.105
A. Eiseman I: These Are the “Financial Records” You’re Looking for, After All
As an initial matter, the supreme court rejected DPW’s claim that they
did not have possession of the records revealing the MCO Rates.106 Then,
the court determined that records showing the MCO Rates were financial
records for purposes of the RTKL.107 The majority emphasized that the
definition of financial records includes records “dealing with” disburseDPW.” Id. at 940. The court went on to find the Provider Rates did not “directly
relate” to the contract between DPW and the MCOs, specifically with respect to the
“performance of [ ] dental services.” See id. at 940–41 (citing Buehl v. Office of
Open Records, 6 A.3d 27, 31 (Pa Commw. Ct. 2010)).
100. See id. at 942 (concluding “OOR erred in relying on [Lukes]”).
101. See id. at 944–45 (McCullough, J., dissenting) (observing that MCOs
could not enter into subcontract without DPW approval).
102. See generally Eiseman I, 125 A.3d at 23 (considering appeal of Commonwealth Court’s decision regarding MCO Rates); Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1218 (addressing appeal of Commonwealth Court’s denial of request for Provider Rates).
103. See Eiseman I, 125 A.3d at 26 (summarizing subsequent history regarding
request for Capitation Rates).
104. See id. at 33 (announcing reversal of lower court’s order and remanding
for further proceedings).
105. See Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1223–24 (affirming lower court’s decision on
narrower grounds).
106. See Eiseman I, 125 A.3d at 29 (finding department’s assertion that it
“neither possess[ed] nor control[led]” documents “not well taken”). The court
observed that DPW had never indicated it did not possess the records either in
response to the initial RTKL request or during earlier hearings. See id. Moreover,
the court noted that MCOs were “required to submit subcontracts delegating their
healthcare-related responsibilities to DPW for . . . advance written approval.” Id.
107. See id. (concluding MCO Rates constitute “financial records”).
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ments of agency funds.108 The court rejected arguments by the MCOs
that such a broad interpretation would eliminate any limits on disclosure
of private contractor records, pointing out that the subcontracts at issue,
unlike most private contractor records, had to be approved by DPW.109
Because the MCO Rates “plainly ‘[dealt] with’ DPW’s disbursement of billions of dollars of public monies . . . as well as the Department’s acquisition of services to meet its own [Medicaid] obligations,” the court
concluded the MCO Rates were financial records, and therefore, the confidential proprietary secrets and trade secrets exemptions under Section
708(b)(11) did not apply.110 The court declined to take up the lower
court’s discussion of Lukes or to decide “the downstream point at which
public funding transforms into private monies.”111
The court then considered whether the MCO Rates were nevertheless
protected by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.112 In the court’s view,
whether the MCO Rates fit the statutory definition of trade secrets was
debatable.113 More importantly, the court concluded that the 2008
RTKL’s specific provisions governing trade secrets superseded the more
general protection provided by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.114 There108. See id. (rejecting narrow interpretation of “financial records” favored by
DPW and MCOs) (citing 65 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67.102 (West 2016);
N. Hill News Record v. Town of McCandless, 722 A.2d 1037, 1039 (Pa. 1999)).
Justice Eakin wrote a brief dissent, insisting “the plain language of the RTKL does
not cover this situation” and generally endorsing the Commonwealth Court’s arguments that the MCO rates were not financial records. See id. at 33 (Eakin, J., dissenting). Justice Eakin would have “remand[ed] the matter to the OOR” to apply
the exemptions under Section 708(b)(11). See id.
109. See id. at 30 (observing that “[i]t is this initial requirement [approval by a
government agency] which separates subcontracts containing the MCO Rates from
third-party records (to which a distinct legal analysis [under section 506(d)] applies)” (citing 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67.506(d) (2015)). The court went on to state
that, in the absence of legislation specifically addressing public access to records
showing expenditure of Medicaid funds, a “liberal interpretation” of the statutory
language was more appropriate than a restrictive, and perhaps “under-inclusive,”
reading. See id. at 31.
110. See id. at 30, 32 (referencing Section 102 in stating “we are simply unable
to conclude that records which much be submitted to a government agency for
approval, and which embody a delegation . . . of a governmental function of the
agency, are not records ‘dealing with’ the agency’s monetary disbursements and
services acquisitions” (citing 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67.102) (2015)); id. at 32 (noting
lack of dispute that exceptions under Section 708(b) do not apply to financial
records).
111. See id. at 33.
112. See id. at 32 (discussing relevance of Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
113. See id. (referencing Uniform Trade Secrets Act in observing that MCO
Rates are not “a close fit with the concept of a ‘trade secret,’ ” because it is not “a
formula, drawing, pattern, compilation . . . device, method, technique or process”
(quoting 12 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5302 (2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
114. See id. (concluding Uniform Trade Secrets Act does not apply). In this
respect, the court relied explicitly on Judge McCullough’s dissent in the Commonwealth Court, which reasoned that the legislature intentionally incorporated the
Trade Secrets Act into the trade secrets provision of the RTKL. See Eiseman I
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fore, the Trade Secrets Act did not provide separate protection against
disclosure.115 Accordingly, the court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s
decision “relative to the MCO Rates.”116
B. Eiseman II: The Supreme Court Finds Lack of a
Contractual Relationship Disturbing
After recounting the lower court’s reasoning, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that the
RTKL “channels access to third-party records through Section 506(d)(1)”;
therefore, the Provider Rates were not presumptively public records under
Section 305.117 The supreme court adopted the lower court’s “litmus test”
for constructive possession that asks “whether the records document a
transaction of the agency to which the request was directed, not whether
they document a transaction of a private contractor.”118 Although the
court acknowledged the Requesters’ concerns with this litmus test, the
court nevertheless felt the test was consistent with the statutory definitions
of records and public records.119
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania similarly affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s holding that Section 506(d)(1) “contemplates an actual
contract with a third party in possession of salient records.”120 The majority provided limited rationale for accepting the lower court’s conclusion;
instead, the court simply cited to a portion of the Commonwealth Court’s
opinion and announced “we will affirm its order upon such basis.”121 In
addition, the majority implicitly accepted the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that the necessary contractual relationship between DPW and the
Commw. Ct. Op., 85 A.3d at 1138 (McCullough, J., dissenting) (noting definitions of
“trade secret” are identical in RTKL and Trade Secrets Act).
115. See Eiseman I, 125 A.3d at 32 (concluding specific treatment of trade
secrets under RTKL “should control in this instance”).
116. See id. at 33 (announcing reversal of Commonwealth Court’s order and
remanding for further proceedings).
117. See Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1223 (announcing court’s holding).
118. See id. at 1219 (agreeing with Commonwealth Court that “record” encompasses “transaction or activity of an agency” within meaning of statute (citing
65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67.102)).
119. See Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1223 (acknowledging that “Section 901 explicitly harkens back to the essential concept of a ‘public record,’ . . . and the incorporated definition of a ‘record’ does encompass the notion of a ‘transaction or
activity of an agency’ to which the intermediate court majority has rightfully affording meaning” (citation omitted) (citing 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67.901 (2015))).
120. See id. at 1223 (announcing court’s decision).
121. See id. (citing Eiseman II Commw. Ct. Op., 86 A.3d at 939–40) (affirming
“essential point” recognized by commonwealth court). In Eiseman II Commw. Ct.
Op., the court “require[d] a contractual relationship between a third party and an
agency to access third-party records.” See Eiseman II Commw. Ct. Op., 86 A.3d at
939–40 (citing Honaman v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 13 A.3d 1014 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2011)).
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Subcontractors did not exist.122 Having concluded such a relationship
was required, the court declined to consider, as the Commonwealth Court
had, whether the Provider Rates directly related to the contractual relationship between DPW and the MCOs.123
The court acknowledged, but ultimately rejected, numerous policybased arguments from the Requesters and amici favoring greater access to
records.124 Instead, the court reiterated that the language of Section
506(d)(1) intentionally includes limitations on the otherwise broad access
to private contractor records.125 The majority further concluded that
“particularized legislative consideration would seem to be in order relative
to the openness or secrecy of third-party records downstream from actual
Commonwealth agency contracts.”126
122. See Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1220 (summarizing, without analysis, Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that requirement for contractual relationship was
not met, as well as dissenting opinion finding contractual relationship was met).
123. See id. at 1220 n.7 (opining that lack of direct contractual relationship
“would seem dispositive”). The court felt the Commonwealth Court’s “line of inquiry” as to whether the Provider Rates directly related to the contractual relationship between DPW and the MCOs (as opposed to Subcontractors) was not
“anchor[ed]” to the language of 506(d)(1). See id. Furthermore, the court expressed “substantial misgivings” with the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion there
was no direct relationship between the Provider Rates and the government function. See id. The court reiterated that “Section 506(d)(1) requires both possession
by ‘a party with whom the agency has contracted to perform a governmental function’ and that the requested record ‘directly relates to the governmental function.’ ” Id. (citing 65 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 67.506(d)(1) (West 2016)).
124. See id. at 1223 (acknowledging, but ultimately rejecting Requesters’ policy-based arguments). The Requesters emphasized a policy of liberal construction.
See id. at 1221; see also Levy v. Senate of Pa., 65 A.3d 361, 381 (Pa. 2013) (“[C]ourts
should liberally construe the RTKL to effectuate its purpose of promoting ‘access
to official government information in order to prohibit secrets, scrutinize actions
of public officials, and make public officials accountable for their actions.’ ” (quoting Allegheny Cty. Dep’t of Admin. Servs. v. A Second Chance, Inc., 13 A.3d 1025,
1034 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011))). The Requesters also argued that the Commonwealth Court’s requirement for a direct contractual relationship would permit contractors to shield records by putting them in the possession of subcontractors. See
Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1221. The Requesters felt that the Commonwealth Court’s
“litmus test” was too narrow, and should extend to records in the “custody and
control” of a government agency. See id. at 1218 n.4. The Eiseman II court explicitly rejected this argument, relying on its reasoning in Office of the Budget. See id. at
1222 n.10 (citing Office of the Budget v. Office of Open Records, 11 A.3d 618,
619–20 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011)). Finally, the Requesters worried that the Commonwealth Court’s ruling might “shift[ ] the burden . . . [onto] requesters” by
requiring them to show that the agency was attempting to hide records with “nongovernmental bod[ies]”. See id. at 1222.
125. See id. at 1223 (“[T]his Court also appreciates that the General Assembly
had tempered such policy [of liberal access] with explicit limiting terms delineated
in the [l]aw, ‘presumably on account of the burden, expense, and other impositions attending wholesale disclosure’ by non-public entities.” (quoting SWB
Yankees LLC v. Wintermantel, 45 A.3d 1029, 1042 (Pa. 2012))).
126. Id. at 1223; see also id. at 1222 (citing Br. for Appellees Dental Benefit
Providers, at 19, Eiseman II, 124 A.3d 1214 (Pa. 2015) (No. 48 EAP 2014)) (stating
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Justice Correale Stevens dissented, faulting the majority for reading
Section 506(d)(1) “too narrowly” and not giving enough weight to the
policy goals of the RTKL.127 Justice Stevens then endorsed Judge McCullough’s argument that the agent-principal relationship between the MCOs
and DPW created the requisite contractual relationship between DPW and
the Subcontractors.128 Emphasizing the importance of transparency, Justice Stevens warned that the majority’s holding would “prevent[ ] the public from holding government agencies accountable and does not require
disclosure of information merely because a ‘middleman’ is involved.”129
V. ANALYSIS: THE SUPREME COURT UNDERESTIMATES
THE POWER OF THE RTKL
The Eiseman II decision highlights an important blind spot in the
RTKL: the statute fails to address the public’s right to access records of
third-party subcontractors performing under downstream agreements with
government contractors.130 Rather than proactively addressing this gap
through judicial interpretation, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
exercised deliberate restraint and left the task of crafting a solution up to
the legislature.131 Without explicitly overruling Lukes, the court quietly
rejected much of Lukes’s reasoning in Eiseman I and Eiseman II.132 MeanEiseman’s argument “is nothing more than a complaint about how the General
Assembly drafted section 506”).
127. See id. at 1224 (quoting Levy, 65 A.3d at 361) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating “objective of the RTKL is ‘to empower citizens by affording them access to
information concerning the activities of their government’ ” (quoting SWB Yankees
LLC, 45 A.3d at 1042)).
128. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Eiseman II Commw. Ct. Op., 86
A.3d 932, 944–45 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (McCullough, J., dissenting)).
129. See id. at 1225 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority decision). Citing several amicus briefs, Justice Stevens summed up the importance of transparency as follows:
[T]he lack of access to the negotiated Provider Rates prevents a full understanding of the relationship between fees and access, which is critical
to addressing disparities in health care cost, quality, and outcomes.
Moreover, lack of information concerning the Provider Rates prevents
fully informed policy decisions regarding the state of Medicaid spending
and impedes necessary analysis required to improve the functioning of
the health care system. Furthermore, transparency in government in the
government’s oversight of Medicaid is necessary toward the interrelated
objective of improving healthcare quality.
Id. (citations omitted).
130. See id. at 1223 (suggesting legislative action needed to address “the openness or secrecy of third-party records downstream from actual Commonwealth
agency contracts”).
131. See id. (“[O]ur present task is one of statutory construction, not independent judicial policymaking.”).
132. See id. at 1220 (rejecting argument that principal-agent relationship between DPW and MCO created requisite contractual relationship between DPW
and Subcontractors); Eiseman I, 125 A.3d 19, 33 (Pa. 2015) (declining to follow
broad reading of RTKL articulated in Lukes). For a further discussion of the treat-
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while, the court interpreted Section 506(d)(1) as requiring a direct contractual relationship between the agency and a third party in possession of
the records, even though such a reading was not compelled by the case
law.133 At the same time, the court deemphasized both the history of liberal construction of the RTKL and the policy goals behind it.134 By deliberately choosing to read the RTKL narrowly, the court missed an
opportunity to proactively resolve the subcontractor question in favor of
broader transparency.135 Moreover, the supreme court’s treatment of
Lukes and its insistence on an actual contract substantially limited the
reach of the RTKL with respect to subcontractor records.136
A. Is the Force Still Strong with Lukes?
Although the supreme court did not explicitly overrule Lukes, the
court’s reasoning in Eiseman I and Eiseman II quietly rejected, and even
ment of Lukes in Eiseman I and Eiseman II, see infra notes 137–42 and accompanying text.
133. See Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1217, 1223 (concluding “direct contractual
relationship” is required to access third-party records under Section 506(d)(1)).
For further analysis of the court’s interpretation of section 506(d)(1), see infra
notes 143–49 and accompanying text.
134. See generally id. at 1224–25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For further critique
of the court’s treatment of policy arguments favoring transparency, see infra notes
150–53 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Capeloto, supra note 11, at 22 (acknowledging “the courts have
had to do the heavy lifting by applying judicial interpretation” where statute does
not explicitly grant access to information in cases of privatization (citing Rani
Gupta, Privatization v. the Public’s Right to Know, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS 10 (Aug. 1, 2007), http://www.rcfp.org/rcfp/orders/docs/PRIVATIZATION.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SB7-BXWL])); Feiser, supra note 4, at 834 (suggesting courts must “clarify the role of public-records laws” in absence of legislative
action); Gedid, supra note 8, at 474 (expressing hope “courts will construe the
RTKL in a manner that is consistent with the legislative intent”).
Feiser warns that “[w]ithout legislative or judicial intervention interpreting
[right to know] statutes broadly, most state governments could effectively transfer
their documents into the hands of private companies and avoid the reach of freedom of information acts.” See Feiser, supra note 4, at 826 (emphasis added).
Capeloto argues courts interpreting state freedom of information statutes should
be guided primarily by “whether nondisclosure harms or impedes the general wellbeing of a citizenry.” See Capeloto, supra note 11, at 41.
Further, Gedid emphasizes the broad array of “weapons” available to appellate
courts to enforce the 2008 RTKL, including attorneys fees, civil penalties, and “any
[other] penalty authorized under ‘applicable rules of court.’ ” See Gedid, supra
note 8, at 472, 474 (discussing remedies and expressing “hope that the
courts . . . will use the penalty provisions to enforce the RTKL”). At the same time,
Gedid notes that the wide variety of exemptions under Section 708(b) will require
“extensive judicial construction,” and expresses concern that courts will interpret
the exceptions narrowly. See id. at 474. Gedid hopes the Commonwealth Court’s
“expertise in administrative law” will give that court greater insight into “the intent
of the Pennsylvania legislature.” See id. at 475.
136. See Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1225 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opining
“[m]ajority’s decision [ ] prevents the public from holding government agencies
accountable”).
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undermined, Lukes.137 In Eiseman I, the court explicitly chose not to follow the Lukes court in attempting to draw a line between public and private funds.138 This arguably calls into question the Lukes court’s reasoning
that records reflecting the expenditure of public funds remain public until the funds reach the intended recipient.139 Although the Eiseman I
court ostensibly agreed with Judge McCullough’s dissent, which relied
heavily on Lukes, the majority stopped short of endorsing Judge McCullough’s reasoning.140 Furthermore, in Eiseman II, the court implicitly rejected the possibility, raised by Lukes and Judge McCullough’s dissent, that
a principal-agent relationship between DPW and the MCOs could create a
direct contractual relationship between DPW and the Subcontractors.141
In light of the court’s interpretation, it is unclear whether Lukes’s expansive, policy-oriented interpretation of the RTKL remains applicable for future courts.142
B. Contractual Relationship Requirement Surrenders Subcontractor Records
to the Dark Side
Prior case law did not necessarily mandate the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania’s conclusion that Section 506(d)(1) requires a contractual
137. See generally id. at 1220–24; Eiseman I, 125 A.3d 29–33. For further discussion of the treatment of Lukes in Eiseman I and Eiseman II, see infra notes 138–41
and accompanying text.
138. See Eiseman I, 125 A.3d at 33 (“In terms of the discussion of the Lukes
decision, we do not find it useful to consider the downstream point at which public
funding transforms into private monies.”).
139. See Lukes v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 976 A.2d 609, 625 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2009) (“Until the public funding reaches the intended Medicaid recipient, the
money remains public . . . . DPW cannot circumvent the disclosure of this money
trail by contracting indirectly [through MCOs].”).
140. See generally Eiseman I, 125 A.3d at 29–30 (agreeing with Judge McCullough’s conclusion that MCO Rates constitute financial records, without further
discussion or analysis of Judge McCullough’s reasoning). Although the court acknowledged the MCO position “greatly understates the relationship” between the
MCOs and Subcontractors, the court did not explicitly endorse the position taken
by Judge McCullough and the Lukes court that the MCOs act as agents of DPW. See
generally id. (making no comment describing MCOs as agents of DPW).
141. Compare Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1220 (summarizing Judge McCullough’s
argument without analysis or commentary), and id. at 1219–20, 1223 (affirming,
implicitly, Commonwealth Court’s finding that no contractual relationship existed
between DPW and Subcontractors), with id. at 1224–25 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(endorsing Judge McCullough’s agency argument).
142. Compare Eiseman I, 125 A.3d at 125 (explicitly declining to consider
“downstream point at which public funding transforms into private monies”), with
Lukes, 976 A.2d at 624–25 (concluding funds disbursed by DPW remain public
funds until they reach Medicaid recipients). Compare Lukes, 976 A.2d 621–24 (finding Provider agreements are product of agency relationship between DPW and
MCO), with Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1223 (rejecting requester’s position that principal-agent between DPW and MCO established requisite contractual relationship
between DPW and Subcontractors).
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relationship.143 The Commonwealth Court cited Honaman to uphold the
notion that “[t]his court requires a contractual relationship between a
third party and an agency to access third party records,” an assertion the
supreme court accepted without comment.144 However, this formulation
of Honaman’s holding came from In re Venango County Tourism Promotion
Agency, not Honaman.145 Moreover, it is questionable whether the
Honaman decision actually addressed, or was intended to address, the extent of access to third-party records under Section 506(d)(1).146 The discussion in Honaman actually focused on the scope of agency possession
under Section 305(a), rather than access to third-party records.147 Additionally, the Honaman court relied on Office of the Budget to conclude certain tax records were not “in the possession” of the township because there
was no contractual relationship between the township and the tax collector.148 However, Office of the Budget did not consider whether Section

143. See generally Honaman v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 13 A.3d 1014, 1019–23
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (focusing on reach of Section 305(a), not Section
506(d)(1)); Office of the Budget v. Office of Open Records, 11 A.3d 618, 621 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2011) (explicitly stating Section 506(d)(1) was not at issue).
144. Compare Eiseman II Commw. Ct. Op., 86 A.3d 932, 940 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2014) (citing Honaman, 13 A.3d at 1022), with Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1223 (citing
Eiseman II Commw. Ct. Op., 86 A.3d at 940).
145. Compare Eiseman II Commw Ct. Op. 86 A.3d at 940 (“This Court requires a
contractual relationship between a third party and an agency to access third-party
records.” (citing Honaman, 13 A.3d 1014)), with In re Venango Cty. Tourism Promotion Agency, 83 A.3d 1101, 1110 (Pa. Commw. 2014) (“This Court requires a
contractual relationship between a third party and an agency to access third-party
records.” (citing Honaman, 13 A.3d 1014)).
146. See generally Honaman, 13 A.3d at 1019–22 (discussing Section 506(d)(1)
primarily in passing or in footnotes). The trial court in Honaman found Section
506(d)(1) inapplicable because the tax collector was “not an ‘agency’ ” subject to
the RTKL and did not have a contract with the township. See id. at 1017–18. However, the primary issue before the Commonwealth Court was whether the township
had possession or control over the records at issue. See id. at 1019 (summarizing
issue in discussion heading).
147. See generally id. at 1019–22 (evaluating whether township had
“[p]ossess[ion] [o]r [c]ontrol” over “the records generated and maintained by the
tax collector”). In its discussion, the court excerpted provisions of the RTKL defining “record” and “public record,” as well as Section 305(a). See id. at 1019–20
(summarizing key rules). Then, the court provided an extended excerpt from Office of the Budget discussing whether the presumption under Section 305(a) extended to records “[within] an agency’s custody or control, not merely in its
possession.” See id. at 1022–23 (quoting Office of the Budget, 11 A.3d at 621–23).
However, the only reference to Section 506(d) in the Honaman court’s discussion
is a single footnote quoting the statute added by the Honaman court to clarify a
passing reference to Section 506(d) in the excerpt from Office of the Budget. See id.
at 1020 n.6 (providing statutory language of Section 506(d)(1)).
148. See id. at 1020–22 (drawing comparison to facts of Office of the Budget).
For additional background on the Honaman case, see supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text.
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506(d)(1) could apply in the absence of a direct contractual relationship
because neither party raised the issue.149
The plain language of Section 506(d)(1) provided more support for a
contractual relationship requirement, a point the MCOs and Subcontractors recognized in their brief.150 However, in crediting this argument, the
court overlooked the policy of liberal construction of the RTKL articulated in earlier cases.151 Similarly, the supreme court undervalued the numerous policy arguments favoring greater transparency.152 By affirming
the contractual relationship requirement, the court not only restricted the

149. See Office of the Budget, 11 A.3d at 621 (declining to consider whether
records would be disclosable under Section 506(d)(1)). The Honaman court was
correct that there was no contract between the Office of the Budget and the subcontractor in that case. See id. (“[N]either the OOR nor the Requester argue that
the Grant Agreement is a contract to perform a governmental function on behalf
of Budget such that the requested payroll records are public records under Section
506(d)(1).”). However, precisely for that reason, the Office of the Budget court explicitly declined to consider whether those records were accessible under Section
506(d)(1). See id. (“[T]he issue of whether the payroll records would be disclosable pursuant to [Section 506(d)(1)] is not before this [c]ourt.”).
150. See 65 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67.506(d)(1) (West 2016) (“A
public record . . . in the possession of a party with whom the agency has contracted . . .
shall be considered a public record of the agency . . . .” (emphasis added)); Br. for
Appellees Dental Benefit Provides, supra note 126, at 19–20 (pointing out “the
plain terms of the statute do ‘requir[e] a contractual relationship’ for constructive
agency possession to exist” (alteration in original) (emphasis added)). In their
brief to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the MCOs and Subcontractors argued
that “the General Assembly was well aware” of the use of subcontractors by government contractors but chose not to write Section 506(d)(1) in such a way as to
reach subcontractors. See id. The supreme court appears to credit this argument
in Eiseman II, acknowledging that “the General Assembly had tempered [a policy of
liberal interpretation] with explicit limiting terms . . . ‘presumably on account of
the burden, expense, and other impositions attending wholesale disclosure’ by
non-public entities.” See Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1223 (quoting SWB Yankees LLC v.
Wintermantel, 45 A.3d 1029, 1042 (Pa. 2012)).
151. See Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1224 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opining that
majority inappropriately fails to apply “liberal construction”) (citing Levy v. Senate
of Pa., 65 A.3d 361, 381 (Pa. 2013); SWB Yankees LLC, 45 A.3d at 1042).
152. See id. (summarizing policy arguments in favor of broad disclosure). For
full discussion of the policy arguments put forth by Justice Stevens and amici for
the Requester, see supra note 129 and accompanying text. See also Gedid, supra
note 8, at 474 (“The sponsors of the [2008 RTKL] and the legislature sought a
broad definition of public documents and records in order to bring transparency,
trust and accountability to . . . government.”); Somers & Perkins, supra note 8, at
154 (“It is [ ] crucial for Medicaid beneficiaries, policymakers, and the general
public to have access to information indicating whether public money is being well
spent and used so as to ensure that people obtain quality health care services.”).
In explaining why transparency is crucial, Somers and Perkins emphasize the
profit-maximizing incentives driving MCOs and provide several examples of how
financial incentives led to underutilization of services and poor quality outcomes
in managed care programs. See id. (citing NHELP, REPORT: THE PURSUIT OF MEDICAID MANAGED CARE QUALITY INFORMATION IN SIX STATES (2010)).
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reach of the RTKL, but also missed an opportunity to further the statute’s
goal of promoting greater transparency.153
VI. CONCLUSION: HARD TO SEE, SUBCONTRACTOR RECORDS ARE
(AMEND THE RTKL, THE LEGISLATURE MUST)
Going forward, the Eiseman I decision will give taxpayers and consumer advocates more information about how taxpayer dollars given to
Medicaid contractors are being spent.154 Not only will the public be able
to access information on payments made by MCOs to subcontractors, like
the dental subcontractors at issue here, taxpayers will also be able to see
payments made directly by MCOs to medical providers, such as physicians,
hospitals, and pharmacies.155 Advocates for the Public Interest Law
Center, the Requesters in the Eiseman cases, believe most contracts with
medical providers and physician rate schedules will now be publicly available under Eiseman I.156 Eiseman I could also improve public access to government contracts outside of Medicaid where a third party delivers
government services under a direct agreement with a government
contractor.157
However, where that government contractor and the third party delivering services are separated by a subcontractor, Eiseman II effectively
153. See Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1224 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opining that
majority’s decision is contrary to purpose of RTKL); Capeloto, supra note 11, at 41
(calling on courts to apply “public good” standard in determining access to
records of non-public entities); Feiser, supra note 4, at 836–53 (discussing examples of “twenty-two states” whose courts have employed “flexible standards” in applying their freedom-of-information statutes to private entities); Gedid, supra note
8, at 474 (expressing “hope that the courts will construe the [2008] RTKL in a
manner that is consistent with legislative intent [of greater transparency]”).
154. See Shayna Posses, Pa. High Court Says Some Medicaid Rates Are Public Info,
LAW360 (Oct. 28, 2015, 4:14 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/720002/pahigh-court-says-some-medicaid-rates-are-public-info [https://perma.cc/P6EKUPUL] (reporting reactions by requesters to supreme court decision); PUB. INT. L.
CTR., supra note 17 (“[T]he public has the right to scrutinize how billions of dollars in taxpayer funds flow from [DHS] to private insurance companies to operate
the state’s Medicaid program.”).
155. See id. (“[T]he ruling also has broader implications beyond just dental
rates because it should mean that physician rate schedules are also public
record.”).
156. See id. (reporting Requester’s assessment of impact of Eiseman I); PUB.
INT. L. CTR., supra note 17 (“Although most Medicaid dental provider contracts
remain inaccessible, the high court’s main decision means that medical provider
contracts are subject to public release, because there are fewer middlemen between medical providers and DHS.”).
157. See Posses, supra note 154 (quoting commentator characterizing Eiseman
I as “an important win for transparency in government” that “recognizes that the
public has the right to scrutinize how public funds are spent” (quoting Benjamin
Geffen, Staff Attorney for Public Interest Law Center) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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shields the downstream contract from public scrutiny.158 As Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion notes, policymakers and consumer advocates may
be prevented from obtaining a clear picture of where Medicaid dollars are
going, making it harder to control costs and address issues with healthcare
access and quality.159 Moreover, the Eiseman II decision could make it
harder for the press and taxpayers to monitor spending not just within
Medicaid, but anywhere taxpayer dollars are funneled through contractors
and subcontractors.160
Looking ahead, the legislature should take the supreme court’s advice and revisit the RTKL with respect to subcontractor records.161 Extending the RTKL to reach downstream subcontracts, like those at issue in
Eiseman II, would further the statute’s goals of promoting transparency
and accountability.162 Given Pennsylvania’s increasing reliance on private
contractors and subcontractors, it is all the more important that the legis158. See Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1224–25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing
concern that “[m]ajority’s decision” will “prevent[ ] the public from holding government agencies accountable”); Joshua D. Bonn, PA Supreme Court Clarifies Accessibility of Government Contractor/Subcontractor Records, NAUMAN SMITH RIGHT TO KNOW
& MEDIA L. BLOG (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.nssh.com/2015/11/pa-supremecourt-clarifies-accessibility-of-government-contractorsubcontractor-records/
[https://perma.cc/896W-FNHC] (noting Eiseman II decision “confirms that government contractors may enter subcontracts to shield the ultimate expenditure of
public funds”).
159. See Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1225 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (summarizing
policy arguments raised in amicus briefs). For a fuller explanation of these policy
arguments, see supra note 129 and accompanying text. See also Somers & Perkins,
supra note 8, at 154 (stressing importance of public “access to information indicating whether public money is being well spent and used so as to ensure that people
obtain quality health care services”).
160. See Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1225 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[L]ack of information concerning the Provider Rates prevents fully informed policy decisions regarding the state of Medicaid spending and impedes necessary analysis . . . .”);
Feiser, supra note 4, at 834 (discussing complaints by some press that “previously
public records,” including health data and tax records, will become inaccessible
due to privatization).
161. Cf. Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1223 (acknowledging “importance” of Medicaid program and “immense associated expense” as reasons why “legislative consideration would seem to be in order”); Somers & Perkins, supra note 8, at 154
(describing financial incentives for MCOs to reduce utilization of services).
162. See Levy v. Senate of Pa., 65 A.3d 361, 381 (Pa. 2013) (articulating purpose of RTKL); Eiseman II, 124 A.3d at 1223 (majority opinion) (acknowledging
“salient policy considerations favoring public access” to subcontractor records and
recommending legislative action); id. at 1224 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (faulting majority for reading RTKL too narrowly to fulfill legislative purpose of transparency);
see also Gedid, supra note 8, at 460 (“Pennsylvania needs a stronger open records
law because openness builds trust in government. Transparency gives the public
the ability to review government actions, to understand what government does, to
see when government performs well, and when government should be held accountable.” (quoting Third Consideration and Final Passage of Right to Know Law:
Hearing on S.B. 1 Before the General Assembly, 2007 Leg., 191st Sess. (Pa. 2007) (statement of Sen. Pileggi, Bill Sponsor))); Feiser, supra note 4, at 833 (“Not only should
the public be able to monitor the private company’s activities, but the monitoring
should be on the same terms as when the agency was the information vendor.”).
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lature take action before government-funded programs become buried
under layers of privatization.163
163. See Feiser, supra note 4, at 825–26, 834, 864 (expressing concern of some
observers that “once-public” records could become inaccessible without changes to
public access statutes (quoting Don Noel, Privatization Shouldn’t Reduce Public Information, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 16, 1997, at A11)); Frankel, supra note 2, at 1452
(“As governments continue to delegate public functions to private companies, it is
critically important to . . . ensure that private companies give proper respect to
public values and constitutional rights.”); Somers & Perkins, supra note 8, at 155
(stressing “urgent need” for public access to data showing how public funds are
spent by MCOs).
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